The Perspectives on Terrorism site
(http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120&Itemid=1)
has a new article, with some relevance to the tragedy in Texas: Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat Attacks, by Brigitte L Nacos.
Hwoever, the author seems a little confused -
much of what she says makes sense, but I disagree strongly with the view that: "The adoption of effective terrorist tactics, however, does not cause terrorism per se because those tactics are imitated or adapted by organizations that already exist and have embraced terrorism.". Nacos reinforces her point by quoting from Mark Sedgwick (‘Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism.’) - "A particular terrorist technique is only of interest to a group that has already made the decision to adopt a terrorist strategy; a technique cannot on its own cause a resort to terrorism.".
Well.. whilst that may generally be true, it seems to me that at the lower end of the attack-complexity scale, it is fundamentally flawed. The Fort Hood attack seems capable of lowering the threshold for political violence of disaffected - but thus far unengaged - Muslims in America. By demonstrating what can be achieved with only two handguns, and by his personal example, Hasan will have had a considerable - and unpredictable - impact on Muslims in the US and, of course, further afield. I will be extremely surprised if we do not see further 'lone wolf' (or small group) attacks inspired by Major Hasan's action within, say, the next 6 months.
At the upper end of complexity - IED's, missiles, etc. - then someone who is already a terrorist would naturally find it easier to learn from others' operations and adopt their techniques, and, equally, an uninvolved person would find the 'barriers to market-entry' fairly difficult to overcome. However, there will always be individuals who, due to their history (police, military, civilian explosives user ?) would find it much easier to cross that threshold. For that reason, I believe Nacos' premise, whilst broadly reflecting the majority of cases, is certainly not a definitive description of every situation.
And it seems rather odd that Nacos spends much of her time presenting evidence of previously non-violent parties being inspired to violence (e.g. Timothy McVeigh,Seung-hui Cho), and then, somehow, reaching the above contradictory conclusion.
Proof of her muddled analysis will , alas, come with the next "Fort Hood"-style attack.
...
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Leaderless Jihad - again
(Yup, should have posted thsi months ago)
I admire Mr Sageman's research on known AQ operators, and the information he has gathered on those. The book covers areas that other experts haven't touched.
He clearly writes very much for an American audience, (e.g. referring to the little-known “Abraham Lincoln Brigade” in the Spanish Civil War, rather than “the International Brigades”), and this may help explain his odd views – cheerleading for the American Dream - on Islamic experience in the US and Europe (see my earlier comment on this book).
So, good on basics, less so in analysis, and, there is an obvious lack of knowledge of terrorism, even of the better known events. The US Embassy bombings in E Africa took place in 1998, the Beslan school atrocity occurred in 2004, and I’m pretty sure it wasn’t the French Embassy (!) that was suicide-bombed in Beirut in 1983…
(Digression: it was of course the US Embassy that was blown up in Beirut – and not once, but twice, albeit in 2 different locations). [Does anyone know who was in charge of security at the time of the second attack? And what happened to them subsequently ? Just curious...]
The book is certainly of interest for those seeking understanding of AQ terrorism - but only if you take some of his statements with a pinch of salt…
Since reading this I have also purchased his earlier work on Understanding Terror Networks, [so even though I may not be his biggest fan, I am helping to pay his bills :-) ] which is a much simpler and more straightforward explanatory text, with less imposition of his own deductions and analysis (and all the better for that ?). That said, being published in 2004 it’s fairly old hat now and possibly wouldn’t add a great deal to your understanding of AQ or other groups.
Of course, the recent Ft Hood attack and the lengthening list of small-scale attacks within the US do rather undermine his position on Mulsim immigrants 'successful integration'.
I admire Mr Sageman's research on known AQ operators, and the information he has gathered on those. The book covers areas that other experts haven't touched.
He clearly writes very much for an American audience, (e.g. referring to the little-known “Abraham Lincoln Brigade” in the Spanish Civil War, rather than “the International Brigades”), and this may help explain his odd views – cheerleading for the American Dream - on Islamic experience in the US and Europe (see my earlier comment on this book).
So, good on basics, less so in analysis, and, there is an obvious lack of knowledge of terrorism, even of the better known events. The US Embassy bombings in E Africa took place in 1998, the Beslan school atrocity occurred in 2004, and I’m pretty sure it wasn’t the French Embassy (!) that was suicide-bombed in Beirut in 1983…
(Digression: it was of course the US Embassy that was blown up in Beirut – and not once, but twice, albeit in 2 different locations). [Does anyone know who was in charge of security at the time of the second attack? And what happened to them subsequently ? Just curious...]
The book is certainly of interest for those seeking understanding of AQ terrorism - but only if you take some of his statements with a pinch of salt…
Since reading this I have also purchased his earlier work on Understanding Terror Networks, [so even though I may not be his biggest fan, I am helping to pay his bills :-) ] which is a much simpler and more straightforward explanatory text, with less imposition of his own deductions and analysis (and all the better for that ?). That said, being published in 2004 it’s fairly old hat now and possibly wouldn’t add a great deal to your understanding of AQ or other groups.
Of course, the recent Ft Hood attack and the lengthening list of small-scale attacks within the US do rather undermine his position on Mulsim immigrants 'successful integration'.
Back on point...
Well, where to start ? Been offline for too long.
the Indonesians did get the Top man - and quite a few others - eventually, (tho' we still wait to hear what his laptop really had on it).
And then there was Fort Hood, ("terrorism" or not - and does it matter ?). Now waiting for the copycats - has it impacted other disaffected US-resident Muslims ? Will they see the example as worthy of emulation ? And if they do, can a number of small-scale (low casualty) attacks affect the US psyche anywhere near as much as 9/11 ?
1st Anniversary of Mumbai of course - still waiting for another big hotel attack, following the Jakarta bombings (if it works, they'll keep doing it, and copying it).
Loads of other stuff (US military personnel killed in Philippines - Seabees, allegedly - hmm...), so let's get on with it.
...
the Indonesians did get the Top man - and quite a few others - eventually, (tho' we still wait to hear what his laptop really had on it).
And then there was Fort Hood, ("terrorism" or not - and does it matter ?). Now waiting for the copycats - has it impacted other disaffected US-resident Muslims ? Will they see the example as worthy of emulation ? And if they do, can a number of small-scale (low casualty) attacks affect the US psyche anywhere near as much as 9/11 ?
1st Anniversary of Mumbai of course - still waiting for another big hotel attack, following the Jakarta bombings (if it works, they'll keep doing it, and copying it).
Loads of other stuff (US military personnel killed in Philippines - Seabees, allegedly - hmm...), so let's get on with it.
...
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