The Perspectives on Terrorism site
(http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120&Itemid=1)
has a new article, with some relevance to the tragedy in Texas: Revisiting the Contagion Hypothesis: Terrorism, News Coverage, and Copycat Attacks, by Brigitte L Nacos.
Hwoever, the author seems a little confused -
much of what she says makes sense, but I disagree strongly with the view that: "The adoption of effective terrorist tactics, however, does not cause terrorism per se because those tactics are imitated or adapted by organizations that already exist and have embraced terrorism.". Nacos reinforces her point by quoting from Mark Sedgwick (‘Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism.’) - "A particular terrorist technique is only of interest to a group that has already made the decision to adopt a terrorist strategy; a technique cannot on its own cause a resort to terrorism.".
Well.. whilst that may generally be true, it seems to me that at the lower end of the attack-complexity scale, it is fundamentally flawed. The Fort Hood attack seems capable of lowering the threshold for political violence of disaffected - but thus far unengaged - Muslims in America. By demonstrating what can be achieved with only two handguns, and by his personal example, Hasan will have had a considerable - and unpredictable - impact on Muslims in the US and, of course, further afield. I will be extremely surprised if we do not see further 'lone wolf' (or small group) attacks inspired by Major Hasan's action within, say, the next 6 months.
At the upper end of complexity - IED's, missiles, etc. - then someone who is already a terrorist would naturally find it easier to learn from others' operations and adopt their techniques, and, equally, an uninvolved person would find the 'barriers to market-entry' fairly difficult to overcome. However, there will always be individuals who, due to their history (police, military, civilian explosives user ?) would find it much easier to cross that threshold. For that reason, I believe Nacos' premise, whilst broadly reflecting the majority of cases, is certainly not a definitive description of every situation.
And it seems rather odd that Nacos spends much of her time presenting evidence of previously non-violent parties being inspired to violence (e.g. Timothy McVeigh,Seung-hui Cho), and then, somehow, reaching the above contradictory conclusion.
Proof of her muddled analysis will , alas, come with the next "Fort Hood"-style attack.
...
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Leaderless Jihad - again
(Yup, should have posted thsi months ago)
I admire Mr Sageman's research on known AQ operators, and the information he has gathered on those. The book covers areas that other experts haven't touched.
He clearly writes very much for an American audience, (e.g. referring to the little-known “Abraham Lincoln Brigade” in the Spanish Civil War, rather than “the International Brigades”), and this may help explain his odd views – cheerleading for the American Dream - on Islamic experience in the US and Europe (see my earlier comment on this book).
So, good on basics, less so in analysis, and, there is an obvious lack of knowledge of terrorism, even of the better known events. The US Embassy bombings in E Africa took place in 1998, the Beslan school atrocity occurred in 2004, and I’m pretty sure it wasn’t the French Embassy (!) that was suicide-bombed in Beirut in 1983…
(Digression: it was of course the US Embassy that was blown up in Beirut – and not once, but twice, albeit in 2 different locations). [Does anyone know who was in charge of security at the time of the second attack? And what happened to them subsequently ? Just curious...]
The book is certainly of interest for those seeking understanding of AQ terrorism - but only if you take some of his statements with a pinch of salt…
Since reading this I have also purchased his earlier work on Understanding Terror Networks, [so even though I may not be his biggest fan, I am helping to pay his bills :-) ] which is a much simpler and more straightforward explanatory text, with less imposition of his own deductions and analysis (and all the better for that ?). That said, being published in 2004 it’s fairly old hat now and possibly wouldn’t add a great deal to your understanding of AQ or other groups.
Of course, the recent Ft Hood attack and the lengthening list of small-scale attacks within the US do rather undermine his position on Mulsim immigrants 'successful integration'.
I admire Mr Sageman's research on known AQ operators, and the information he has gathered on those. The book covers areas that other experts haven't touched.
He clearly writes very much for an American audience, (e.g. referring to the little-known “Abraham Lincoln Brigade” in the Spanish Civil War, rather than “the International Brigades”), and this may help explain his odd views – cheerleading for the American Dream - on Islamic experience in the US and Europe (see my earlier comment on this book).
So, good on basics, less so in analysis, and, there is an obvious lack of knowledge of terrorism, even of the better known events. The US Embassy bombings in E Africa took place in 1998, the Beslan school atrocity occurred in 2004, and I’m pretty sure it wasn’t the French Embassy (!) that was suicide-bombed in Beirut in 1983…
(Digression: it was of course the US Embassy that was blown up in Beirut – and not once, but twice, albeit in 2 different locations). [Does anyone know who was in charge of security at the time of the second attack? And what happened to them subsequently ? Just curious...]
The book is certainly of interest for those seeking understanding of AQ terrorism - but only if you take some of his statements with a pinch of salt…
Since reading this I have also purchased his earlier work on Understanding Terror Networks, [so even though I may not be his biggest fan, I am helping to pay his bills :-) ] which is a much simpler and more straightforward explanatory text, with less imposition of his own deductions and analysis (and all the better for that ?). That said, being published in 2004 it’s fairly old hat now and possibly wouldn’t add a great deal to your understanding of AQ or other groups.
Of course, the recent Ft Hood attack and the lengthening list of small-scale attacks within the US do rather undermine his position on Mulsim immigrants 'successful integration'.
Back on point...
Well, where to start ? Been offline for too long.
the Indonesians did get the Top man - and quite a few others - eventually, (tho' we still wait to hear what his laptop really had on it).
And then there was Fort Hood, ("terrorism" or not - and does it matter ?). Now waiting for the copycats - has it impacted other disaffected US-resident Muslims ? Will they see the example as worthy of emulation ? And if they do, can a number of small-scale (low casualty) attacks affect the US psyche anywhere near as much as 9/11 ?
1st Anniversary of Mumbai of course - still waiting for another big hotel attack, following the Jakarta bombings (if it works, they'll keep doing it, and copying it).
Loads of other stuff (US military personnel killed in Philippines - Seabees, allegedly - hmm...), so let's get on with it.
...
the Indonesians did get the Top man - and quite a few others - eventually, (tho' we still wait to hear what his laptop really had on it).
And then there was Fort Hood, ("terrorism" or not - and does it matter ?). Now waiting for the copycats - has it impacted other disaffected US-resident Muslims ? Will they see the example as worthy of emulation ? And if they do, can a number of small-scale (low casualty) attacks affect the US psyche anywhere near as much as 9/11 ?
1st Anniversary of Mumbai of course - still waiting for another big hotel attack, following the Jakarta bombings (if it works, they'll keep doing it, and copying it).
Loads of other stuff (US military personnel killed in Philippines - Seabees, allegedly - hmm...), so let's get on with it.
...
Saturday, August 15, 2009
AQ’s Future – Part 2: Characteristics of 'homegrown' cells
I commented recently on a book concerning itself with home-grown terror cells (Leaderless Jihad), and have been thinking a little more about that concept. Here’s a view from this layman:
These independent, ‘self-radicalised’ offshoots of AQ can be expected to have some interesting defining characteristics.
Without necessarily having direct contact with the AQ “higher command” they are still influenced – perhaps “strategically and ideologically-guided” might better describe it - by AQ’s centre. Or, more accurately, by what they can discern from the centre – whether through the media, jihadist websites, underground DVDs, or even the latest rumour at the mosque or other meeting place.
Importantly however, we note that they are not directly commanded or controlled.
Developing that further, they are completely free to launch entirely autonomous operations. Free to set their own pace, and control all aspects of attacks. Factors such as: targeting, timing, logistics, resources, etc. are all directly in the hands of the devolved unit.
That said, they would seem likely to be influenced by the centre when making their choices. Targeting is probably the most interesting factor in an attack [well, until we see the first nuke I guess]. Looking - and I confess my lack of research here - at the targets of the homeboys over recent years, there are no great surprises: ground transportation, hotels, military bases (Fort Dix, the planned Australian army barracks, etc.), airports/airlines, and soft targets – large groups people, etc., etc. Just as if they’d selected them straight from the Jihadists’ Big Book Of Tactical Plays.
The range of weaponry open to these units is, naturally, potentially huge. From all of the conventional, historically-used ones, (small-arms, IEDs, suicide IEDs, heavier weapons – mortars, missiles, etc.) plus the misuse potential of a plethora of everyday civilian technologies: from crashing a school bus, to sabotaging the reactor of a nuclear power station.
The autonomy of the unit results in very limited communications with existing AQ and related structures (perhaps none). Limited in all facets: a restricted communication capability, a restricted need for communication and - significantly – restricted in the quantity of communications.
In terms of their personnel selection, the unit has many possibilities. Teams of different sizes, or even individuals, of varying racial and ethnic profiles and backgrounds.
Linked to the composition of the team, is its leadership. Simply thinking "I’m going to start my own cell” may be the only relevant qualification for command. Those who do lead home-grown units will be of unpredictable experience and have had a range of training, from those who have perhaps have undergone national military service somewhere, to those whose only preparation has been on their X-Box.
Financing of terrorists has been a major focus for the West for many years, and that would certainly be affected by the circumstances of a home-grown operation. Again, there is a wide potential spectrum, dependent on the individuals in the unit and who or what they have access to. But a reasonable presumption would be that the higher-value category of potential operations are less likely to be undertaken by them.
Having considered these characteristics, what might they mean for us – for Western counter-terrorism?
On influence/direction from AQ central: home-grown units may rely predominantly on open-source material for strategic guidance. This could be of great benefit to CT analysts in predicting their actions, as they have the same set of sources available to them. And this increases our chances in protecting (the correct) potential targets.
On autonomy, and the lack of central command and control: no orders from above of course mean none for the Western agencies’ superior technology to intercept. That could imply that ‘top-down’ pursuit will be almost impossible. To compensate, security forces could ‘flood’ the potential extremist population with informants – willing or unwilling – to try and make up for the deficit.
On targeting strategies, and weapons of choice: one recent example may be the bulldozer attacks in Israel, by individual Palestinians. But it could be insider sabotage of, well, just about anything: nuclear power station at the top-end, to cutting the brake-cable on the school bus at the other.
No weapons to acquire, no smuggling, no training requirement – using the everyday has many advantages for small-scale operations. From the CT perspective, however, the established tactic of tracking or disrupting supply of conventional (or even CBRN) weapons will now no longer be enough. The range of unconventional weapons is too great. Personnel are the sole underpinning requirement for these types of small-scale operations, and security forces must focus more strongly on them.
On lack of communications to identify and track down: home-grown AQ will need to be pro-actively found, before they can be pursued and dealt with. The long-standing reality whereby we rely on investigations of other network branches to reveal hidden cells simply will not happen.
On personnel issues and team constituents: a reasonable assumption may be that larger teams tend to result in poorer operational security. Another working assumption could be the probable correlation between larger attack teams and more spectacular attacks [9/11 and Mumbai being the most obvious two]. Consequently, therefore, smaller and more tightly controlled home-grown units would result in a prevalence of smaller attacks. Additionally, without security breaches to give them away, such attacks may more often be successfully initiated.
On limited funding for home-grown ops: this could likely to lead to a prevalence of low-cost attacks, which, of necessity, may steer their planners towards the types of unconventional attacks discussed above. And which we’ve already realised would be more difficult to detect and interdict.
On variable quality leadership for home-grown units: if they do have poor leaders, that could benefit the security forces, and maybe some thought can be applied by our agencies to the errors these leaders might make (especially in the planning and preparation stages). Again this brings us back to a focus on the personnel: CT bodies must increase efforts to identify and monitor experienced/trained terrorists before they put together one of these units – and that use of limited government resources might reap great benefits.
That’s enough from me for now.
These independent, ‘self-radicalised’ offshoots of AQ can be expected to have some interesting defining characteristics.
Without necessarily having direct contact with the AQ “higher command” they are still influenced – perhaps “strategically and ideologically-guided” might better describe it - by AQ’s centre. Or, more accurately, by what they can discern from the centre – whether through the media, jihadist websites, underground DVDs, or even the latest rumour at the mosque or other meeting place.
Importantly however, we note that they are not directly commanded or controlled.
Developing that further, they are completely free to launch entirely autonomous operations. Free to set their own pace, and control all aspects of attacks. Factors such as: targeting, timing, logistics, resources, etc. are all directly in the hands of the devolved unit.
That said, they would seem likely to be influenced by the centre when making their choices. Targeting is probably the most interesting factor in an attack [well, until we see the first nuke I guess]. Looking - and I confess my lack of research here - at the targets of the homeboys over recent years, there are no great surprises: ground transportation, hotels, military bases (Fort Dix, the planned Australian army barracks, etc.), airports/airlines, and soft targets – large groups people, etc., etc. Just as if they’d selected them straight from the Jihadists’ Big Book Of Tactical Plays.
The range of weaponry open to these units is, naturally, potentially huge. From all of the conventional, historically-used ones, (small-arms, IEDs, suicide IEDs, heavier weapons – mortars, missiles, etc.) plus the misuse potential of a plethora of everyday civilian technologies: from crashing a school bus, to sabotaging the reactor of a nuclear power station.
The autonomy of the unit results in very limited communications with existing AQ and related structures (perhaps none). Limited in all facets: a restricted communication capability, a restricted need for communication and - significantly – restricted in the quantity of communications.
In terms of their personnel selection, the unit has many possibilities. Teams of different sizes, or even individuals, of varying racial and ethnic profiles and backgrounds.
Linked to the composition of the team, is its leadership. Simply thinking "I’m going to start my own cell” may be the only relevant qualification for command. Those who do lead home-grown units will be of unpredictable experience and have had a range of training, from those who have perhaps have undergone national military service somewhere, to those whose only preparation has been on their X-Box.
Financing of terrorists has been a major focus for the West for many years, and that would certainly be affected by the circumstances of a home-grown operation. Again, there is a wide potential spectrum, dependent on the individuals in the unit and who or what they have access to. But a reasonable presumption would be that the higher-value category of potential operations are less likely to be undertaken by them.
Having considered these characteristics, what might they mean for us – for Western counter-terrorism?
On influence/direction from AQ central: home-grown units may rely predominantly on open-source material for strategic guidance. This could be of great benefit to CT analysts in predicting their actions, as they have the same set of sources available to them. And this increases our chances in protecting (the correct) potential targets.
On autonomy, and the lack of central command and control: no orders from above of course mean none for the Western agencies’ superior technology to intercept. That could imply that ‘top-down’ pursuit will be almost impossible. To compensate, security forces could ‘flood’ the potential extremist population with informants – willing or unwilling – to try and make up for the deficit.
On targeting strategies, and weapons of choice: one recent example may be the bulldozer attacks in Israel, by individual Palestinians. But it could be insider sabotage of, well, just about anything: nuclear power station at the top-end, to cutting the brake-cable on the school bus at the other.
No weapons to acquire, no smuggling, no training requirement – using the everyday has many advantages for small-scale operations. From the CT perspective, however, the established tactic of tracking or disrupting supply of conventional (or even CBRN) weapons will now no longer be enough. The range of unconventional weapons is too great. Personnel are the sole underpinning requirement for these types of small-scale operations, and security forces must focus more strongly on them.
On lack of communications to identify and track down: home-grown AQ will need to be pro-actively found, before they can be pursued and dealt with. The long-standing reality whereby we rely on investigations of other network branches to reveal hidden cells simply will not happen.
On personnel issues and team constituents: a reasonable assumption may be that larger teams tend to result in poorer operational security. Another working assumption could be the probable correlation between larger attack teams and more spectacular attacks [9/11 and Mumbai being the most obvious two]. Consequently, therefore, smaller and more tightly controlled home-grown units would result in a prevalence of smaller attacks. Additionally, without security breaches to give them away, such attacks may more often be successfully initiated.
On limited funding for home-grown ops: this could likely to lead to a prevalence of low-cost attacks, which, of necessity, may steer their planners towards the types of unconventional attacks discussed above. And which we’ve already realised would be more difficult to detect and interdict.
On variable quality leadership for home-grown units: if they do have poor leaders, that could benefit the security forces, and maybe some thought can be applied by our agencies to the errors these leaders might make (especially in the planning and preparation stages). Again this brings us back to a focus on the personnel: CT bodies must increase efforts to identify and monitor experienced/trained terrorists before they put together one of these units – and that use of limited government resources might reap great benefits.
That’s enough from me for now.
Top still missing
Oh well, Noordin Mohammed Top was not tracked down - yet - by Indonesian police and intel. But they are on the case, are disrupting his operations and are gathering more intelligence.
Fingers crossed for the next time. And still waiting to hear more about such plans as may have been uncovered by these recent events.
Fingers crossed for the next time. And still waiting to hear more about such plans as may have been uncovered by these recent events.
Friday, August 7, 2009
Good days for the Good Guys
Baitullah Mehsud dead in Pakistan and Noordin Top dead in Indonesia (according to latest report) – well, it’s very nice to have good news.
Of course, both are replaceable, but fortunately for us, almost certainly not with commanders of the same quality.
And I hope my predictions (see Resurgent JI below) have now been made obsolete. (Tho’ it will be interesting to see what information on JI’s intentions comes out from the Indonesian police over coming days…).
Now if only someone could find the tall old guy with the beard…
Of course, both are replaceable, but fortunately for us, almost certainly not with commanders of the same quality.
And I hope my predictions (see Resurgent JI below) have now been made obsolete. (Tho’ it will be interesting to see what information on JI’s intentions comes out from the Indonesian police over coming days…).
Now if only someone could find the tall old guy with the beard…
AQ’s Future – Part 1
Much (too much?) has been written throughout this decade on the subject of “What will AQ do next?”. So, here’s my tuppence worth…
From psychology [and God knows, terrorism seems to attract psychologists and psychiatrists like flies to… well, you get the point] the concept of Gestalt is widely known. In layman’s terms - and for a simple soul like me - it can be understood as: ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.
From early in its history, AQ could be described in such a way. Small numbers of terrorists, almost always with unsophisticated weapons - and poorly trained in comparison with Western military and security organisations – were able to fight above their weight and dramatically rock global culture -and all in a relatively short time (e.g. from Embassy bombings in Africa, to 9/11 in only a few years).
The inverse of the Gestalt analog is arguably also true: AQ is smaller than the sum of its (now myriad) parts. Many recent apparent AQ attacks have of course been carried out by local adherents – who have little connection to, or communication with, that central band of “AQ Core” jihadis. [AQ Prime/Brand AQ/ etc. /call it whatever you like...]
Whilst the “Brand AQ” concept has existed for years, and mainly around pre-existing groups, we have seen latterly a blossoming of new and unconnected cells, drawing spiritual sustenance from AQ’s widely disseminated message, while setting their own course in the world of jihad.
Almost a decade ago now, 9/11 reverberated around the world, raising existential fears among the Western nations that we thought had evaporated with the Cold War more than a decade before. Since that day, billions of dollars have been expended by scores of nations on ‘counter terrorism’ efforts. And few on the planet, even in the remotest provinces of distant lands, have never heard of the events of 9/11 or Osama bin Laden.
“I am fighting so I can die a martyr and go to heaven to meet God. Our fight is now against America. I regret having lived this long. I have nothing to lose” – so said bin Laden in August 1998 [Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism Columbia University Press, July, 2006]. AQ’s continuation after his death is inevitable, though the form it will take is much less certain.
The longer-serving AQ ‘franchises’ and associated groups in Iraq, in SE Asia, in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa, seem certain to continue on their current paths: experienced jihadis, doing what they’ve always done (albeit with localised innovation – or at least a sort of shifting plagiarism). As CT capacity is built in those nations, and as Western powers focus their efforts more tightly, those groups may gradually be eroded, by that combination of policing, limited military operations and non-military soft power that has reaped success elsewhere.
But the “Brand AQ” phenomenon evolves still: looking to the not-too-distant past for signs, we saw that in 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi negotiated for months with AQ core, before restyling his group - Tawhid wal Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad) - as ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQI). The formality of that negotiation, and the very explicit centralised control exercised by the AQ leadership at that time, may already be a thing of the past.
In RAND's report on “How terrorist groups end”, [Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki. How terrorist groups end : lessons for countering Al Qa’ida, RAND, 2008] the authors’ conclude: “a transition to the political process is the most common reason that terrorist groups end”.
That outcome is difficult to envisage of AQ at this juncture. However, the expansion of the network under ‘Brand AQ’ at least raises the possibility that one faction - not directly under control of AQ core - could challenge for the top spot and take AQ’s mantle in the eyes of global Islam. Conceivably, it might then be possible to successfully treat with such a successor organisation and bring about the kind of resolution that is currently unthinkable.
Though perhaps not for a good number of years yet. The ‘Long War’ indeed…
From psychology [and God knows, terrorism seems to attract psychologists and psychiatrists like flies to… well, you get the point] the concept of Gestalt is widely known. In layman’s terms - and for a simple soul like me - it can be understood as: ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’.
From early in its history, AQ could be described in such a way. Small numbers of terrorists, almost always with unsophisticated weapons - and poorly trained in comparison with Western military and security organisations – were able to fight above their weight and dramatically rock global culture -and all in a relatively short time (e.g. from Embassy bombings in Africa, to 9/11 in only a few years).
The inverse of the Gestalt analog is arguably also true: AQ is smaller than the sum of its (now myriad) parts. Many recent apparent AQ attacks have of course been carried out by local adherents – who have little connection to, or communication with, that central band of “AQ Core” jihadis. [AQ Prime/Brand AQ/ etc. /call it whatever you like...]
Whilst the “Brand AQ” concept has existed for years, and mainly around pre-existing groups, we have seen latterly a blossoming of new and unconnected cells, drawing spiritual sustenance from AQ’s widely disseminated message, while setting their own course in the world of jihad.
Almost a decade ago now, 9/11 reverberated around the world, raising existential fears among the Western nations that we thought had evaporated with the Cold War more than a decade before. Since that day, billions of dollars have been expended by scores of nations on ‘counter terrorism’ efforts. And few on the planet, even in the remotest provinces of distant lands, have never heard of the events of 9/11 or Osama bin Laden.
“I am fighting so I can die a martyr and go to heaven to meet God. Our fight is now against America. I regret having lived this long. I have nothing to lose” – so said bin Laden in August 1998 [Bruce Hoffman Inside Terrorism Columbia University Press, July, 2006]. AQ’s continuation after his death is inevitable, though the form it will take is much less certain.
The longer-serving AQ ‘franchises’ and associated groups in Iraq, in SE Asia, in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa, seem certain to continue on their current paths: experienced jihadis, doing what they’ve always done (albeit with localised innovation – or at least a sort of shifting plagiarism). As CT capacity is built in those nations, and as Western powers focus their efforts more tightly, those groups may gradually be eroded, by that combination of policing, limited military operations and non-military soft power that has reaped success elsewhere.
But the “Brand AQ” phenomenon evolves still: looking to the not-too-distant past for signs, we saw that in 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi negotiated for months with AQ core, before restyling his group - Tawhid wal Jihad (Group of Monotheism and Jihad) - as ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq’ (AQI). The formality of that negotiation, and the very explicit centralised control exercised by the AQ leadership at that time, may already be a thing of the past.
In RAND's report on “How terrorist groups end”, [Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki. How terrorist groups end : lessons for countering Al Qa’ida, RAND, 2008] the authors’ conclude: “a transition to the political process is the most common reason that terrorist groups end”.
That outcome is difficult to envisage of AQ at this juncture. However, the expansion of the network under ‘Brand AQ’ at least raises the possibility that one faction - not directly under control of AQ core - could challenge for the top spot and take AQ’s mantle in the eyes of global Islam. Conceivably, it might then be possible to successfully treat with such a successor organisation and bring about the kind of resolution that is currently unthinkable.
Though perhaps not for a good number of years yet. The ‘Long War’ indeed…
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Suicide Terrorism - nothing new to see here folks, move along...
Is there anything new, after the many (many) papers, studies and books over the last 8 years, to say about the tactic of suicide terrorism?
Judging by this recent article, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=71&Itemid=54
on the Perspectives on Terrorism site (www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/) , the answer is “No, not really”.
The authors state:
The strategic goals most often associated with suicide operations are the following:
1. Expulsion of foreign occupying forces;
2. Obtaining national independence;
3. Destabilization or replacement of a political regime;
4. Intensification of a violent conflict in progress;
5. Interruption of some process of peaceful solutions for a political, ethnic or religious conflict.
Strange, but don’t those goals fit a lot of conflicts that never had a single suicide attack ?
(N Ireland; Rhodesia; Mozambique; Angola; Palestine – no, the earlier one, by Jewish terrorists; the Balkans; etc.)
Then, they go on to look at advantages to the terrorist groups using the tactic:
High lethality. Well… er, possibly, but many attacks have few fatalities (second bomber in Jakarta the other week got two victims – he would have been better off with a baseball bat and a screwdriver). And some have none (anyone remember the idiots who attacked the US consulate in Algiers a couple of years ago? See http://www.nzherald.co.nz/algeria/news/article.cfm?l_id=466&objectid=10434500 )
Facilitates access to certain well-protected and high value political, military or symbolic targets. “For example, political leaders or public buildings.” – Yeah. Maybe. But if you can get close to the target with explosive and blow yourself up, doesn’t it follow you can get close to the target and, well, not blow yourself up ? Like, throw the damn bomb ? Place it under the table and walk out [Valkyrie, anyone ?], or just shoot or stab the target(s) ?
Precision guaranteed by means of the attacks. Sound reasonable? Strange, then, that they contradict it by saying “Even if the suicide bomber would be stopped by a security force, he/she could still activate the explosive and cause some damage.” Hmm, some damage. Mortars, missiles and large-calibre rounds (I’m meaning from HMG up to light artillery) don’t get "stopped by security". That’s real “guaranteed precision”.
Simplification of the attacks and risk reduction. Really ? How many attacks have been detected, due to the high stress on the operative(s); how many detonated to no effect (see Algiers, above); and how many simply changed their minds and walked or ran away ?
They then present a neat little diagram on ‘motivational processes' that looks pretty much like the factors for terrorism in general, and further go on to rehash long established views on ‘martyrdom operations’.
Have to take issue with one throwaway line in that latter part tho’: in Higher contrast of identities between insurgents and their adversaries and targets, they say “indeed, that is the reason why suicide attacks against military personnel or senior officials gain a stronger social support that those attacks carried out against civilians”.
Does that seem unusual to you? Don’t we also feel differently when we hear that airstrikes in Afghanistan have actually killed Taliban or AQ fighters, rather than ordinary men, women and children at a family gathering ? That’s a perfectly natural response, so why comment on it ?
It gets worse.
In the appealingly-titled Defensive Measures section [well, I had high hopes when I saw it], we get: “Defensive measures try to keep suicide bombers from reaching their targets. These include the erection of physical barriers, the installation of cameras and surveillance systems …” – my emphasis. Going by the number of CCTV videos we’ve seen of “martyrs” detonating, cameras and all don’t mean a hell of a lot to a suicidal bomber !
And then, in the next section on military measures: “using firearms to repel the approach of car-bombs..” Really ? Kill the driver, knock the vehicle off-course, detonate it if you get a lucky hit - those I can see. But "repel" ? Not so much. If I’m driving a big bomb to kill you infidels, and it’s going to kill me also, then being “repelled” by your decadent Western bullets isn’t gonna happen, believe me.
Okay, unless someone has something really new on suicide terrorism, or - better yet - on how to combat it, can we all just shut up about it please?
That’s it. Rant over.
(you want to rant ? get your own blog – it’s very therapeutic :-)
Only a few days into this blog and I’m beginning to feel that us non-academics may just have something useful to contribute to (practical) debate about terrorism.
(There’s probably a good PhD thesis in examining the growth of the academic study of terrorism since 9/11, and how much real value has actually accrued as a result. As opposed to, say, metrics like: how many papers produced, theses written, degrees gained, book advances secured, TV interviews given, etc., etc.)
Not that there isn't a place for Ivory Towers...
Judging by this recent article, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=71&Itemid=54
on the Perspectives on Terrorism site (www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/) , the answer is “No, not really”.
The authors state:
The strategic goals most often associated with suicide operations are the following:
1. Expulsion of foreign occupying forces;
2. Obtaining national independence;
3. Destabilization or replacement of a political regime;
4. Intensification of a violent conflict in progress;
5. Interruption of some process of peaceful solutions for a political, ethnic or religious conflict.
Strange, but don’t those goals fit a lot of conflicts that never had a single suicide attack ?
(N Ireland; Rhodesia; Mozambique; Angola; Palestine – no, the earlier one, by Jewish terrorists; the Balkans; etc.)
Then, they go on to look at advantages to the terrorist groups using the tactic:
High lethality. Well… er, possibly, but many attacks have few fatalities (second bomber in Jakarta the other week got two victims – he would have been better off with a baseball bat and a screwdriver). And some have none (anyone remember the idiots who attacked the US consulate in Algiers a couple of years ago? See http://www.nzherald.co.nz/algeria/news/article.cfm?l_id=466&objectid=10434500 )
Facilitates access to certain well-protected and high value political, military or symbolic targets. “For example, political leaders or public buildings.” – Yeah. Maybe. But if you can get close to the target with explosive and blow yourself up, doesn’t it follow you can get close to the target and, well, not blow yourself up ? Like, throw the damn bomb ? Place it under the table and walk out [Valkyrie, anyone ?], or just shoot or stab the target(s) ?
Precision guaranteed by means of the attacks. Sound reasonable? Strange, then, that they contradict it by saying “Even if the suicide bomber would be stopped by a security force, he/she could still activate the explosive and cause some damage.” Hmm, some damage. Mortars, missiles and large-calibre rounds (I’m meaning from HMG up to light artillery) don’t get "stopped by security". That’s real “guaranteed precision”.
Simplification of the attacks and risk reduction. Really ? How many attacks have been detected, due to the high stress on the operative(s); how many detonated to no effect (see Algiers, above); and how many simply changed their minds and walked or ran away ?
They then present a neat little diagram on ‘motivational processes' that looks pretty much like the factors for terrorism in general, and further go on to rehash long established views on ‘martyrdom operations’.
Have to take issue with one throwaway line in that latter part tho’: in Higher contrast of identities between insurgents and their adversaries and targets, they say “indeed, that is the reason why suicide attacks against military personnel or senior officials gain a stronger social support that those attacks carried out against civilians”.
Does that seem unusual to you? Don’t we also feel differently when we hear that airstrikes in Afghanistan have actually killed Taliban or AQ fighters, rather than ordinary men, women and children at a family gathering ? That’s a perfectly natural response, so why comment on it ?
It gets worse.
In the appealingly-titled Defensive Measures section [well, I had high hopes when I saw it], we get: “Defensive measures try to keep suicide bombers from reaching their targets. These include the erection of physical barriers, the installation of cameras and surveillance systems …” – my emphasis. Going by the number of CCTV videos we’ve seen of “martyrs” detonating, cameras and all don’t mean a hell of a lot to a suicidal bomber !
And then, in the next section on military measures: “using firearms to repel the approach of car-bombs..” Really ? Kill the driver, knock the vehicle off-course, detonate it if you get a lucky hit - those I can see. But "repel" ? Not so much. If I’m driving a big bomb to kill you infidels, and it’s going to kill me also, then being “repelled” by your decadent Western bullets isn’t gonna happen, believe me.
Okay, unless someone has something really new on suicide terrorism, or - better yet - on how to combat it, can we all just shut up about it please?
That’s it. Rant over.
(you want to rant ? get your own blog – it’s very therapeutic :-)
Only a few days into this blog and I’m beginning to feel that us non-academics may just have something useful to contribute to (practical) debate about terrorism.
(There’s probably a good PhD thesis in examining the growth of the academic study of terrorism since 9/11, and how much real value has actually accrued as a result. As opposed to, say, metrics like: how many papers produced, theses written, degrees gained, book advances secured, TV interviews given, etc., etc.)
Not that there isn't a place for Ivory Towers...
"Leaderless Jihad" - a first reaction to Mr Sageman's book
Just bought, and been skim reading, Marc Sageman’s book, Leaderless Jihad.
Scanned his speculations on why there have been more Muslim terrorist attacks in Europe than in the US since 9/11 [Chapter Five - The Atlantic Divide]. (He has a real down on ‘Old Europe’!).
In brief: the US is a warm and lovely melting pot of racial and religious tolerance [try telling that to the Sikhs and other non-Muslim minorities attacked after 9/11…]. And: Old Europe is a hotbed of nastiness, and intolerant majority communities who don’t understand how to deal with their immigrants. (I’m paraphrasing of course - but only very slightly).
Hmm. I tend to believe in simple explanations being the most likely (see the wonderful Freakonomics for examples).
Look at the history: why do Algerians go to Paris, Indonesians to Amsterdam, Africans from Mozambique and Angola to Lisbon and Sub-continental Asians – and many, many others - to London ?
Because of the old colonial ties of course. Those cities ruled their countries, often for many generations, so there was – and to large extent still is – a very strong pull, both emotional and practical (e.g. language). And for London in particular, for hundreds of years a centre of global power, it is still seen as the closest thing the planet has to a true, cosmopolitan, world capital.
It would also be unsurprising if the immigrants’ relationship to their destination country has an element of duality about it – after all, those cities ruled their home countries. That shared, complex, history is bound to produce rubbing points over those durations and those type of relationships. A chip on the shoulder is eminently understandable. (and don’t kids always find fault with their parents?)
Therefore, over several generations or more, immigrants have made their way to Europe: for education, for employment, for the whole panoply of human motivations - following family, following the last successful émigré from their village or town, following a dream. In many cases they came – and still do – for temporary periods, to gain qualifications or experience that they could not (or cannot) get back home.
The result of these longer term well-worn immigration paths has been traditional, ethnically or religiously homogenous communities, in these and other cities across some of the European states. In some cases, perhaps too traditional communities. European police officers and diplomats visiting the countries of origin have observed that communities in their countries are sometimes ‘living in the past’, with community elders setting standards from the times of their own arrival in the new country, often way back in the '40s, ‘50s and ‘60s. Those standards are sometimes stricter than their old communities, back in the home country - who have themselves - politically, ethically, socially - moved on since then.
Now let’s look at Muslim immigration to the US. Why do people with no obvious historical emotional or other ties, such as those above, choose to head for a completely new life in a very different, major Western country ?
The answer, I suggest, is very similar to that to the excellent chat show question, “So, what first attracted you to the millionaire [Hugh Hefner/Paul Daniels/as appropriate]?”.
Money. Plain and simple, to get to the much-hyped ‘land of opportunity’, to make cash for you and your family. Not that there’s anything at all wrong with that.
So, on the one hand, we see traditional Muslim communities embedded - and not always happily so - within Western countries that have had a difficult historical relationship with their countries of origin . And, on the other hand, Muslims who - just perhaps - put Mammon first in their lives, and need to integrate, because there isn’t an existing community of their people to be absorbed into, and what there is, is spread more thinly amongst America’s multicultural melting pot.
Now, which of those groups seems most likely to you, to spawn disaffected individuals prepared to attack the capitalist, imperialist Western beast in the land in which they now live?
Exactly. So, not really much of a surprise there at all. It was inevitable there would be more homegrown jihadists in Europe.
And no need for the long-winded (and oddly bitter) explanations propounded by Mr S.
I do hope the rest of his book is better thought through.
(and will doubtless post here if it isn't :-)
Scanned his speculations on why there have been more Muslim terrorist attacks in Europe than in the US since 9/11 [Chapter Five - The Atlantic Divide]. (He has a real down on ‘Old Europe’!).
In brief: the US is a warm and lovely melting pot of racial and religious tolerance [try telling that to the Sikhs and other non-Muslim minorities attacked after 9/11…]. And: Old Europe is a hotbed of nastiness, and intolerant majority communities who don’t understand how to deal with their immigrants. (I’m paraphrasing of course - but only very slightly).
Hmm. I tend to believe in simple explanations being the most likely (see the wonderful Freakonomics for examples).
Look at the history: why do Algerians go to Paris, Indonesians to Amsterdam, Africans from Mozambique and Angola to Lisbon and Sub-continental Asians – and many, many others - to London ?
Because of the old colonial ties of course. Those cities ruled their countries, often for many generations, so there was – and to large extent still is – a very strong pull, both emotional and practical (e.g. language). And for London in particular, for hundreds of years a centre of global power, it is still seen as the closest thing the planet has to a true, cosmopolitan, world capital.
It would also be unsurprising if the immigrants’ relationship to their destination country has an element of duality about it – after all, those cities ruled their home countries. That shared, complex, history is bound to produce rubbing points over those durations and those type of relationships. A chip on the shoulder is eminently understandable. (and don’t kids always find fault with their parents?)
Therefore, over several generations or more, immigrants have made their way to Europe: for education, for employment, for the whole panoply of human motivations - following family, following the last successful émigré from their village or town, following a dream. In many cases they came – and still do – for temporary periods, to gain qualifications or experience that they could not (or cannot) get back home.
The result of these longer term well-worn immigration paths has been traditional, ethnically or religiously homogenous communities, in these and other cities across some of the European states. In some cases, perhaps too traditional communities. European police officers and diplomats visiting the countries of origin have observed that communities in their countries are sometimes ‘living in the past’, with community elders setting standards from the times of their own arrival in the new country, often way back in the '40s, ‘50s and ‘60s. Those standards are sometimes stricter than their old communities, back in the home country - who have themselves - politically, ethically, socially - moved on since then.
Now let’s look at Muslim immigration to the US. Why do people with no obvious historical emotional or other ties, such as those above, choose to head for a completely new life in a very different, major Western country ?
The answer, I suggest, is very similar to that to the excellent chat show question, “So, what first attracted you to the millionaire [Hugh Hefner/Paul Daniels/as appropriate]?”.
Money. Plain and simple, to get to the much-hyped ‘land of opportunity’, to make cash for you and your family. Not that there’s anything at all wrong with that.
So, on the one hand, we see traditional Muslim communities embedded - and not always happily so - within Western countries that have had a difficult historical relationship with their countries of origin . And, on the other hand, Muslims who - just perhaps - put Mammon first in their lives, and need to integrate, because there isn’t an existing community of their people to be absorbed into, and what there is, is spread more thinly amongst America’s multicultural melting pot.
Now, which of those groups seems most likely to you, to spawn disaffected individuals prepared to attack the capitalist, imperialist Western beast in the land in which they now live?
Exactly. So, not really much of a surprise there at all. It was inevitable there would be more homegrown jihadists in Europe.
And no need for the long-winded (and oddly bitter) explanations propounded by Mr S.
I do hope the rest of his book is better thought through.
(and will doubtless post here if it isn't :-)
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Jakarta bombs 2009: what next for resurgent JI ?
On the 17th of July 2009, 2 bombs at two Western hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia killed 7 civilians (and the two suicide bombers). 6 of the 7 were foreigners: 3 Australians, 2 Dutch, and 1 New Zealander. The seventh was a waiter at the JW Marriott.
So what lessons might be drawn from these attacks ?
Firstly and perhaps most obviously, the terrorists appear to have studied last year’s Mumbai hotel attacks. There, LeT fedayeen checked in as guests and operated from a room inside the Taj hotel. That lesson was replicated by Jemaah Islamiyah: 3 (or more) operatives were seen using room 1808 at the JW Marriott, and they appear to have constructed (or at least assembled prepared components for) their IEDs.
Secondly, they appear to have attempted to repeat one of their own, previously successful, tactics. In Bali in 2002, one of the devices detonated in Paddy’s Pub, naturally causing survivors and bystanders to flee towards the street. Which is where the other – vehicle-borne - device was waiting. Most of the casualties were caused by that second bomb.
In the Marriott, the device later found intact in room 1808 was set to detonate prior to the morning attacks. So if that had gone off first, as apparently planned, it would have caused panic and driven guests towards the foyer and main entrance, where the as-yet-unidentified bomber would have had a truly target-rich environment. As it happened, that device failed, and is now one the key leads that Indonesian police believe points toward Noordin Mohammed Top.
Thirdly, the use of near-simultaneous attacks was again demonstrated to be highly desirable to Islamist terrorists. The follow-on to the Marriott restaurant bomb occurred in the entrance area of the adjacent Ritz-Carlton hotel less than 5 minutes later.
All considered, a pretty good day for JI, and a riposte to those analysts who’d written them off after they failed to strike back last November when the 2002 Bali bombers were executed.
And now there’s much thought by the Indonesian security agencies, and the many involved Western agencies, as to what happens next.
What looks likely ? Let’s ponder:
The attackers appear to have learned from Mumbai ? Combine that thought with the strong desire to avoid Indonesian casualties, and you have to think guns and maybe grenades. So why not those on July 17 ? Perhaps it’s coming. If they’d done that first, the current increased security at the Western hotels (more front-of-house, more armed external guards, discreet armed guards outside the breakfast restaurant) would more closely resemble Baghdad’s Green Zone defences. So, why would you do that first if your other option is suicide attackers ? Sequencing is everything…
Keeping with the ‘avoid local casualties’ theme, and the previous JI experience of car-bombs, perhaps something like the Karachi attack on the US consulate in March 2006 ? There, a suicide bomber rammed a US consulate vehicle with his VBIED, killing 4 including a US diplomat. There’s potential to limit collateral damage by being very selective, and, the strong possibility of succeeding in killing their target, given the weight of explosive a vehicle can carry.
So, one layman’s view of what JI may do next might be:
Option 1 – Mumbai-style, guns and grenades on hotels, shopping malls or other soft Western targets.
Option 2 – VBIED directed against specific, possibly high-value, target. Perhaps, as in Karachi, a diplomatic one.
Or maybe both…
Thoughts anyone ?
So what lessons might be drawn from these attacks ?
Firstly and perhaps most obviously, the terrorists appear to have studied last year’s Mumbai hotel attacks. There, LeT fedayeen checked in as guests and operated from a room inside the Taj hotel. That lesson was replicated by Jemaah Islamiyah: 3 (or more) operatives were seen using room 1808 at the JW Marriott, and they appear to have constructed (or at least assembled prepared components for) their IEDs.
Secondly, they appear to have attempted to repeat one of their own, previously successful, tactics. In Bali in 2002, one of the devices detonated in Paddy’s Pub, naturally causing survivors and bystanders to flee towards the street. Which is where the other – vehicle-borne - device was waiting. Most of the casualties were caused by that second bomb.
In the Marriott, the device later found intact in room 1808 was set to detonate prior to the morning attacks. So if that had gone off first, as apparently planned, it would have caused panic and driven guests towards the foyer and main entrance, where the as-yet-unidentified bomber would have had a truly target-rich environment. As it happened, that device failed, and is now one the key leads that Indonesian police believe points toward Noordin Mohammed Top.
Thirdly, the use of near-simultaneous attacks was again demonstrated to be highly desirable to Islamist terrorists. The follow-on to the Marriott restaurant bomb occurred in the entrance area of the adjacent Ritz-Carlton hotel less than 5 minutes later.
All considered, a pretty good day for JI, and a riposte to those analysts who’d written them off after they failed to strike back last November when the 2002 Bali bombers were executed.
And now there’s much thought by the Indonesian security agencies, and the many involved Western agencies, as to what happens next.
What looks likely ? Let’s ponder:
The attackers appear to have learned from Mumbai ? Combine that thought with the strong desire to avoid Indonesian casualties, and you have to think guns and maybe grenades. So why not those on July 17 ? Perhaps it’s coming. If they’d done that first, the current increased security at the Western hotels (more front-of-house, more armed external guards, discreet armed guards outside the breakfast restaurant) would more closely resemble Baghdad’s Green Zone defences. So, why would you do that first if your other option is suicide attackers ? Sequencing is everything…
Keeping with the ‘avoid local casualties’ theme, and the previous JI experience of car-bombs, perhaps something like the Karachi attack on the US consulate in March 2006 ? There, a suicide bomber rammed a US consulate vehicle with his VBIED, killing 4 including a US diplomat. There’s potential to limit collateral damage by being very selective, and, the strong possibility of succeeding in killing their target, given the weight of explosive a vehicle can carry.
So, one layman’s view of what JI may do next might be:
Option 1 – Mumbai-style, guns and grenades on hotels, shopping malls or other soft Western targets.
Option 2 – VBIED directed against specific, possibly high-value, target. Perhaps, as in Karachi, a diplomatic one.
Or maybe both…
Thoughts anyone ?
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